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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2112 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH L. OVERTON, 
 
                             Appellant 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:01-cr-00431-1) 
District Judge:  Hon. Petrese B. Tucker 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 17, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, CHAGARES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 22, 2011) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Joseph Overton appeals the District Court’s sentence for his violation of 
supervised release.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite 
the facts.  Overton was sentenced to seventy-seven months of imprisonment followed by 
thirty-six months of supervised release for a bank robbery in 2001.  Less than two weeks 
after being released from prison in 2007, Overton again committed a bank robbery.  He 
was later sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment for the second bank robbery.  The 
instant appeal arises from his sentence of twenty-four months of imprisonment for 
violation of supervised release.  In imposing the sentence, the District Court ordered that 
the time for violation of supervised release run consecutively to the fifteen year bank 
robbery sentence because it wanted to punish Overton for the separate crime of violation 
of supervised release above and beyond his punishment for bank robbery. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
sentencing proceeds in two stages:  first, we ensure that no procedural errors occurred, 
and second, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  An abuse of discretion standard 
applies to our review of Overton’s request for a partially concurrent sentence, as this 
objection was preserved.  Id. at 567-58.  We review unpreserved objections to sentencing, 
such as Overton’s claim regarding the correct sentencing factors, for plain error.  United 
States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 2003). 
III. 
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 Overton first argues that the District Court committed a procedural error in failing 
to recognize that it had the power to order part of his sentence for violation of supervised 
release to run concurrently to his bank robbery sentence.  He construes the District 
Court’s comments at sentencing to mean that the District Court believed that it could 
either impose a twenty-four month sentence to run entirely concurrently or entirely 
consecutively, or that it could impose a shorter sentence to run consecutively, and thereby 
effectively impose a partially concurrent sentence.  What Overton argues the District 
Court did not understand is that it could have still imposed a twenty-four month sentence, 
but ordered a portion of the sentence to run concurrently, with the rest running 
consecutively.  He requests that this Court clarify the options before the District Court 
and remand for further consideration. 
 Although the District Court did not explicitly state that it recognized that it had the 
option to sentence Overton to a partially concurrent sentence, the record in this case 
reflects that the District Court was fully aware of its options.  After the District Court 
stated its intention to sentence Overton for twenty-four months to run consecutively to his 
bank robbery sentence, his attorney requested that some of this period be designated as 
concurrent to the bank robbery sentence.  The District Court stated “[w]ell, when you say 
‘making some part,’ what would be a determinative way to make some part of it 
concurrent?”  Appendix (“App.”) 77-78.  Defense counsel as well as the Government 
then responded by discussing the practical procedure that would be used to effectuate 
such a decision.  The District Court then concluded “[w]ell, arguably, I could just make a 
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lesser sentence, but I’m not inclined to do that.  So, therefore, I’m going to make it 24 
months consecutive.”  Id. at 78.   
These statements do not reflect a confusion over the District Court’s ability to 
order a partially concurrent sentence, but reflect the District Court’s lack of desire to 
shorten the amount of time that Overton would have to serve in prison.  They certainly do 
not constitute an abuse of discretion that would lead this Court to remand the case with 
instructions regarding the various permissible sentencing decisions that the District Court 
could reach.  A judge is in no way required to put on the record every option that is 
available to him before settling on a sentence.  We therefore decline to remand the case 
based upon the District Court’s alleged lack of understanding regarding its options for 
sentencing. 
Overton’s second contention is that the District Court erred in considering its 
desire to punish Overton in imposing its sentence.  This argument relies on the 
distinctions between the sentencing factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which 
sets forth considerations when sentencing for a crime, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which 
describes the procedure to be used when revoking a term of supervised release.  Although 
providing punishment for the crime committed is included in the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, 
it is not incorporated by § 3583(e).  Because of this, Overton asserts that the District 
Court improperly relied on its desire to “punish[ Overton] for a separate crime,” App. 74, 
in its decision to require that the sentence for violation of supervised release run 
consecutively to his sentence for bank robbery. 
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This Court recently concluded that it was permissible for a District Court to 
consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e).  
United States v. Young, No. 10-1513, --- F.3d ----, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We 
now confront directly the question of whether consideration of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
factors in the revocation context is prohibited, and join the Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Sixth Circuits in holding that a district court does not commit procedural 
error in taking into account those factors when imposing a sentence for the violation of 
supervised release.”).  Although “there may be a case where a court places undue weight 
on the seriousness of the violation or the need for the sentence to promote respect for the 
law and provide just punishment,” the consideration of these factors does not constitute a 
procedural error by itself.  Id. at 18.   
Overton also argues that the District Court was focused too strongly on the  
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, but we see no support for this contention in the record.  Brief 
though they may be, the statements of the District Court addressed Overton’s criminal 
history (§ 3553(a)(1)) and the need to protect the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), and also could 
plausibly be taken to reflect a need for deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), all of which are 
factors explicitly incorporated by § 3583(e).  Because the District Court’s additional 
statement regarding the need to punish was not so dominant that it can be described as 
plain error, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
